

Research Article

AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT PUT TO THE TEST BY THE OLIGARCHIC AND EXCLUSIVE NATURE OF THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM SINCE 1960

* Emmanuel NDZENG NYANGONE

Omar Bongo University, Gabon.

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ABSTRACT

This article aims to demonstrate that the claim by some scholars and media that strong states and representative institutions are prerequisites for African development is a common misconception that underestimates the hobbling nature of the current international system. In fact, it oligarchy nature allows a small club of powerful and hegemonic states, permanent members of the UN Security Council with veto power, to subordinate the weaker states (mostly African), despite the legal validity of de jure interstate law. The result to the slavish dependence of African states to the West. This is an atavistic obstacle to self-determination, which is essential for the existence and development of a state. Total emancipation from this system is undeniably a prerequisite for African development. This absolutely requires the deconstruction of the Franco-African servile cooperation agreements and the achievement of African economic independence through the creation of Pan-African Financial Institutions, so dear to the late Libyan president Muammar Gaddafi. Considering the exceptional powers of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, it also calls for better African representation with veto rights in this body. To assume this responsibility, a new generation of transformational leaders not subordinated to the West is fundamental.

Keywords: Africa –Development – International system – Oligarchy – Servitudes – Emancipation.

INTRODUCTION

The international system is a complex set of mechanisms and institutions for regulating international public order. It is constituted in such a way as to cover all fields of international activity. If it is possible for the historian to trace it back to Antiquity¹, it really came into being with the signing of the Treaties of Westphalia on October 24, 1648. Devoting not only the birth of the modern state, but also the establishment of sovereignty as the main basis of relations between states, these treaties enabled the main European powers to meet for nearly a century, at the end of the European Directory also called European Concert, in order to arbitrate political, territorial and colonial conflicts between them: we then spoke of de facto inter-stateism.

It was necessary to wait for the creation of the League of Nations in 1919, then for the birth of the United Nations in 1945 to witness the establishment of an inter-state system of law advocating the sovereign equality recognized to all States. But in the face of the facts, it turned out to be oligarchic and exclusive, because only a select club of the five powerful states, permanent members of the United Nations Security Council with veto power, decide on global governance to the detriment of the weaker ones. They thus play as they please with international law to preserve their selfish interests. Established without Africa, this continent is invited to play only a subordinate role: supplier of raw materials and outlet markets to the major industrial powers. This subaltern African posture has hardly changed regardless of the times and issues. The result is the maintenance of African states in servitude despite the independence of the 1960s. This constitutes a real atavistic obstacle to the development of this continent. Paradoxically, Africa closes its eyes not to see these facts and continues to sleep on the mat of others. Whereas, more than any other continent, it is far from being hopeless

with regard to its ardent youth and its cultural, natural, intellectual and human resources capable of making it a major actor in international relations and not a simple subject undergoing, hence the present study. Therefore, it is appropriate to wonder if the African emancipation this subordinate posture is not a prerequisite sine qua none for the development of this continent? If yes, how to do it?

Without falling into Afro-pessimism², This study demonstrates that Africa cannot develop without emancipating itself from the constraints of the current oligarchic and exclusive international system. Thus, relying on a documentary corpus made up of printed sources, books and scientific articles submitted to the historical method³ and realistic theories⁴ and addiction⁵ international relations for deciphering the

²De nombreux indicateurs attestent les bons résultats économiques actuels du continent africain : forte croissance, baisse de la pauvreté, augmentation des investissements étrangers, apparition d'une classe moyenne (cf. Brunel Sylvie (2004), *L'Afrique, un continent en réserve de développement*, Paris, Bréal, 235 pages). C'est un scénario très classique caractérisé par les disparités entre sous-régions, entre pays, entre espaces nationaux et bien d'autres, sans pour autant permettre à l'Afrique d'influencer les relations internationales en sa faveur.

³La méthode critique de l'histoire est un travail que l'historien applique sur les documents pour parvenir à la vérité historique. Autrement dit, elle permet de valider les faits expliqués et leur situation spatio-temporelle. A ce titre, elle comporte une série d'opérations techniques que l'on rassemble en deux parties. D'abord, la critique externe, qui est la critique d'authentification du document. Celle-ci consiste à établir l'authenticité ou l'originalité du document afin d'attester la véracité des informations qui y sont consignées. Ensuite la critique interne qui invite à l'interprétation des faits pour la détermination de leur exactitude.

⁴Défendue par des auteurs comme Hans Morgenthau (1948), elle consiste à étudier la réalité telle qu'elle est. Aussi est-elle souvent décrite comme une théorie explicative, ne cherchant pas à influencer les cours des événements, mais à en analyser les causes. Elle nous a permis de décrypter les buts inavoués du club restreint des États puissants et hégémoniques qui tirent les ficelles du système onusien en vigueur, notamment en maintenant les pays pauvres dans leur dépendance.

⁵Conçue dans les années 1950, lors d'une phase de radicalisation de la compréhension des rapports internationaux et du développement, la théorie de la dépendance qui a une certaine proximité avec la notion de néocolonialisme est une théorie marxiste issue du champ des sciences sociales (sociologie, histoire, économie et science politique). Se fondant sur une vision holistique du monde, ses défenseurs comme Samir Amin (1973), avancent qu'en dépit de la pauvreté, l'instabilité politique et le sous-développement caractérisant les pays du Sud (conséquence de ce processus

¹Notamment avec l'émergence des premières Fédérations de plusieurs cités grecques dans un but défensif (les symmachies), en l'occurrence la ligue de Délos. Elle fut créée à la fin des guerres médiques en 477 av. J.-C. pour faire face aux Perses et dissoute en 404 av. J.-C. après les guerres médiques.

facts, it highlights the subordination of African states to the West forged by the current oligarchic and exclusive international system. This is clearly the confiscation of their sovereignty, a right that is nevertheless inalienable and imprescriptible and essential to self-determinism and the existence of the State. This violation of the provisions of Article 1, paragraph 2 of the United Nations Charter is an atavistic obstacle to African development, hence the imperative need for emancipation from the current oligarchic and exclusive international system. Among other things, this requires the deconstruction of Franco-African servile cooperation agreements, the creation of pan-African financial institutions, so dear to the late Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi. Considering the exceptional powers of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, he also calls for better African representation with veto power within this body. To assume this responsibility new generation of transformational leaders not subordinate to the West is fundamental. This argument revolves around three axes: the first highlights the oligarchic and exclusive nature of the current international system; the second presents the subordination of African states to the West forged by this system; the third finally focuses on three possible avenues of African leadership for total emancipation.

THE OLIGARCHIC AND EXCLUSIVE CHARACTER OF THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

When it comes to addressing the question or even the problem of state sovereignty in Africa, it is clear to question the content attributed to it. If there is one observation that remains real, it is the fact that the strict conception of the sovereignty of the African State adopted by Africa during the post-independence periods is not a trivial fact. To avoid any hasty conclusions, it is important that it be clarified in the best possible way that the strict or even rigid conception of sovereignty on which the State takes flight in Africa is part of international law. Traditionally conceived in the paradigm of exclusively interstate law, international law⁶ is intended to regulate relations between States in order to guarantee their peaceful coexistence. As such, it makes sovereignty a cardinal principle of international relations. In essence, sovereignty refers to the exercise of state power over a geographical area and the population that occupies it. In its territory, the State has exclusive jurisdiction based on the principle of equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination. According to this principle, the creation of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or integration with an independent State or the acquisition of any other political status freely decided by a people constitutes for this people a means of exercising his right to self-determination⁷. This implies non-interference in the internal affairs of other States. Outside its territory, its independence and non-dependence are recognized by the international community. This prohibits any injunction coming from the outside. Sovereignty is therefore individualistic, because each State seeks to exercise it in its fullness and finds it difficult to bear all external constraints. It affirms the independence of the State in its territory and its international relations. Through it, States are juridically equal; the territorial integrity and political independence of the State are inviolable; each

State enjoys the rights inherent in full sovereignty, in this case the right to freely choose and develop its cultural, social, political, economic and security system; Each State has the duty to respect the personality of other States; Every State has the right to discharge fully and in good faith its international obligations and to live in peace with other States⁸. Consequently, sovereignty is not an ideal to be achieved by States, but rather an inalienable and imprescriptible right undeniably linked to self-determinism, essential to the existence of the State. It prohibits hierarchy and subordination between States.

However, it goes without saying that this legal validity is obviously not often recognized in African States since 1960, particularly in French-speaking black Africa (Cameroon, Chad, CAR, DRC, Gabon, Congo, Benin, Togo, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Mali, etc.), so much so that Africa finds itself marginalized in the international system. It is hardly possible to notice this outside of deciphering the historical evidence, in this case the undeniable exclusivity of the status of permanent member of the United Nations Security Council; the complicit UN omerta on the neocolonialist nature of the Franco-African cooperation agreements; African marginality in a globalized economy African marginality in a globalized economy African marginality in a globalized economy.

The exclusive status of permanent member of the UN Security Council

The UN was not designed to be an instrument at the exclusive service of the selfish interests of powerful and hegemonic States, but precisely to defeat landed inter-statism and hegemonic super-statism in order to guarantee peace and international security. . With a view to the equal inclusion of all States in the accomplishment of this central mission, a multilateral politico-diplomatic architecture was put in place to prevent and eliminate threats to peace, to repress any act of aggression or other breach of the peace, in accordance with the principles of international law. Also, the use of force and the obligation of peaceful settlement of inter-State disputes, to which the United Nations can contribute, were established as a rule accepted by all States⁹. To do this, the United Nations set up six main organs¹⁰, many subsidiary bodies¹¹ and specialized or related institutions¹².

Under Article 24 of the United Nations Charter, the maintenance of international peace and security was entrusted to the Security Council. Under article 39, it is empowered to proceed with the qualification of any international fact that may constitute a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression and to prevent the outbreak of conflicts (prevention¹³). If the conflict has already broken out, he strives for a peace that must be respected. However, such an operation is only possible starting from a situation

⁸Ibid.

⁹Charte de l'ONU, article 1, alinéa 1.

¹⁰L'Assemblée générale, le Conseil de sécurité, le Conseil économique et social, le Conseil de tutelle, la Cour internationale de Justice et le Secrétariat.

¹¹En fonction des besoins, des logiques bureaucratiques et souvent aussi pour répondre aux revendications des pays du Sud anciennement colonisés, notamment la commission des droits de l'homme ou la commission du droit international; le haut commissariat aux droits de l'homme et le haut commissariat pour les réfugiés (HCR); les programmes pour le développement (PNUD), l'environnement (PNUE), l'alimentation (PAM); le fonds pour l'enfance (UNICEF); etc.

¹²Il s'agit des organisations intergouvernementales qui possèdent des statuts, des organes, un budget, un personnel, une direction et un siège qui leur sont propres, mais elles sont reliées à l'ONU afin d'assurer une coordination de leurs travaux. Parmi les plus connus, on peut citer L'Organisation pour l'alimentation et l'agriculture (FAO); l'Organisation mondiale de la santé (OMS), les institutions économiques et financières internationales (Fonds monétaire international et la Banque mondiale); etc.

¹³Pour ce qui est de la prévention, des missions politiques peuvent être envoyées, éventuellement avec un Envoyé spécial du Secrétaire-général qui engage les discussions avec les parties au conflit. La médiation ou la pression diplomatique permettent d'éviter que les belligérants ne recourent à la violence. Une déclaration du Conseil de sécurité peut également peser lourd dans la balance.

historiques de dépendance conséquence de processus historiques mis en place par les pays du Nord), les pays du Nord ont besoin de ceux du Sud afin de s'assurer de la continuité de leur croissance. En conséquence, tout en les intégrant, il faut structurellement les maintenir en état de dépendance continue. Elle nous a permis de comprendre les ambiguïtés du système onusien qui se veut un inter-étatisme de droit, mais paradoxalement se caractérise par l'inter-étatisme foncier et le super-étatisme hégémonique dont les évidences sont notoires en Afrique.


⁶L'article 2, alinéa 1, de la Charte des Nations Unies pose ce principe comme règle générale de droit international reconnu par tous les États.

⁷Organisation des Nations-Unies, Résolution 2625 (XXV) sur la déclaration relative aux principes du droit international touchant les relations amicales et la coopération entre les États conformément à la Charte des Nations Unies du 24 octobre 1970.

to which legal criteria are applied in order to qualify it and consider it as a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression. . But the letter of article 39 does not expressly provide for the modalities of this operation to qualify any act as a threat to international peace and security. This gives rise to the free assessment of the members of this body since it mentions that the Board notes the existence of its situations. Having no limits as to the qualification of its situations as a threat to the peace, the drafters of the Charter deliberately left the formula threat to the peace indeterminate, in order to allow the Security Council to broaden its field of action (Lagrange E et al, 1999, p. 36-37). This legal operation is of some importance because it involves the adoption of economic, political and even military sanctions¹⁴ to maintain or restore international peace and security. The stakes are high and the power of the Security Council in this area is growing (Combacau J, 1994, p.146). Endowed with a power of coercion, its decisions are binding and mandatory, insofar as all member countries of the United Nations must apply them. This makes it the most powerful institutional body in the world, the very incarnation of the concept of power which structures international relations, the cenacle where the balance and progress of the world are created and undone, the place where a simple veto resolves or bogs down a conflict.

However, the distribution of seats¹⁵ of this main UN institution is highly unequal. In the broad sense of its very selective and restricted composition, it comprises 15 members, including five permanent members (United States, Russia, China, France, United Kingdom) holders of the nuclear arsenal and having a right of veto and ten non-permanent members. -permanent staff renewed on a continuous basis with five new members each year to take up their duties six months later. Just before entering the track, the elected officials have an accelerated training in the protocol and customs of the Council. These so-called non-permanent are elected by the UN General Assembly for a two-year term (see image no1 below).

Image no1 :



Pacific Institute, "Introducing China to the Limitation of Nuclear Arms", 06/06/2019, [On line] <http://institut-du-pacifique.org/2020/08/07/introduire-la-chine-dans-la-limitation-des-armements-nucleaires/> (Accessed on 04/10/2023)

In order to guarantee a balanced representation on a planetary scale, the general assembly respects in its election well-defined proportions

¹⁴Charte des Nations Unies, chapitre VII, articles 41 et 42.

¹⁵Les plus lorgnés de la planète et font l'objet de tous les fantasmes d'États.

making it possible to always have five members from the States of Africa and Asia, one member for Eastern Europe, two members from Latin American and Caribbean countries and two members from Western European and other countries. Voting in the Security Council follows fairly complicated rules. For procedural matters, 9/15 votes are enough to pass a resolution. On the other hand, for any other question, the five permanent members must be among the nine voting members. In the event of the absence or abstention of a permanent member, a resolution may pass, provided there are 9 votes. However, each of the five permanent members of the Security Council has the right to object to a decision (right of veto). In this case, the decision does not pass¹⁶. This gives them exclusive privileges going as far as the subordination of weak States. This practice severely handicapped the Council, especially during the Cold War. After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, its operation received a new impetus. Given the validity of realist and geopolitical approaches to the analysis of international relations in the design of the foreign policies of States, it is not surprising to note that the permanent members of the Security Council who hold the right of veto modulate international relations by according to their own selfish interests. Ready for discreet consensus except when their national interests are or seem to be threatened, this restricted club of powerful and hegemonic States has always known how to play with international law in order to preserve its selfish interests. The result is the ambiguous construction and regulation of international society. One of the most obvious signs is the simultaneous application of two central concepts of the realist theory of International Relations: the balance of powers and hegemonic stability. The balance of power refers to the equilibrium relationship formed when several national powers, more or less equal, enter into competition. This competition prevents one of them from gaining the upper hand over the other (Kegley C and Wittkopf W, 2005, p. 503) and by extension guarantees a security that is certainly global¹⁷ more relative¹⁸. The period of the Cold War during which the United States and the Soviet Union were in competition is a good illustration of this. In this competition comparable to a zero-sum game, any gain of one is necessarily at the expense of the other. As a result, international security becomes precarious and highly unstable for the competing great powers to derive maximum benefit. This results in the strict application of the realist approach: we then speak of "land interstateism". As for hegemonic stability, it consecrates to the hegemonic state the capacity for decisive dominance in the economic, technological and military domains (Keohane R O, 1984) and to create and enforce international norms: this is "super-statism hegemonic". It refers to three main meanings: the concentration of material means (economic and military) of power by a single state (realistic approaches); the legitimization of a dominant discourse based on the confusion between the particular interest of this State and the universal interest (neo-Marxist critical approaches); the stabilization of an international order by a state power promoting cooperation between its peers (neoliberal approaches). For example, the position of Great Britain on a global scale in the 19th century, the policy of the United States with a view to establishing an international financial order at the end of the Second World War illustrate these three approaches respectively. The State that benefits from such a status fully enjoys its hegemonic power, which it modulates within the framework of a multilateral order whose rules it must essentially respect, but often according to its own interests. This unilateral

¹⁶Lassaad Ben Ahmed, « Graphique - Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU : mode d'emploi », Agence Anadolu, 04/01/2018, [En ligne] <https://www.aa.com.tr/fr/monde/graphique-conseil-de-securite-de-l-ONU-mode-d-emploi-1021376> (consulté le 10/04/2023).

¹⁷Parce que le système dégage une marge de sécurité pour tous tant que se maintient la conjoncture voulue.

¹⁸Puisque cette marge est variable entre États. Elle fluctue au fil du temps et dépend d'une balance délicate et précaire.

attitude also makes international security precarious. Because the hegemonic state is opposed to the rest of the states.

In both cases, the result is an ambiguous and unequal regulation of the international system, because it is influenced by the contradictory ambitions of the great powers in competition (case of land inter-stateism) or by the interests of the hegemonic state. (case of hegemonic super-stateism). From then on, the diplomacy of connivance relating both to landed inter-stateism and the resulting hegemonic super-stateism became the norm for the practice of international relations by these great powers in competition on the international scene. To this is added the recurrent instrumentalization, the flagrant and constant violations of inter-stateism of law, which is evident in Africa.

The UN accomplice omerta on the neocolonialist nature of the Franco-African cooperation agreements

When the UN was created in 1945, 750 million people (nearly a third of the world's population) lived in non-self-governing territories dependent on colonial powers. The fundamental mission of the UN being the preservation and restoration of peace and international security, the Charter of the United Nations enshrined respect for the principle of the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination. among the goals of the Organization. In other words, the right to self-determination was considered a factor of international peace and security. From then on, the role of the United Nations in decolonization was based on the principle of the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination, set out in paragraph 2 of Article 1 of its Charter. With the hope of accelerating the progress of decolonization, the General Assembly in 1960 adopted the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. It proclaimed the need to put a speedy and unconditional end to colonialism and to take immediate measures, in the Trust Territories, the Non-Self-Governing Territories and all other territories which had not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of these territories in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom and, in this context, declared that all peoples have the right of self-determination. During the decades that followed, several predominantly African colonial territories gained independence¹⁹.

Independence, for a state or country, is generally understood as the acquisition of its total political sovereignty, the ability to manage its destiny in a sovereign manner. In any case, this is the conception that many African leaders had of it at the time of decolonization. If this access of the majority of African States to independence²⁰ in the 1960s aroused the hope of self-determinism and provoked the exaltation of the legal validity of sovereign equality recognized to all States²¹, more than 78 years later this hope has still not kept the promises of flowers, as evidenced by the balance sheet of Mustapha Ely :

In terms of GDP, the 20 poorest countries in the world are African. The Human Development Index (HDI) of most African countries is below 0.5 (below 0.4 in the Sahel.). The populations of the majority of African countries live below the

poverty line on less than 2 dollars a day. And this does not spare the "rich" African countries, such as South Africa where a third of the population is affected by rampant poverty. Undernourishment and malnutrition are the lot of urban and rural populations who have less than 1 doctor per 100,000 inhabitants. Illiteracy has reached 70% of the adult population and unemployment is hitting young people left behind. The riches of the soil and the subsoil are plundered by multinationals with contracts ceded by corrupt rulers and executed by overexploiting cheap African labor. The income from the exploitation of wealth does not benefit populations directly by raising their standard of living (distribution of wealth) or indirectly through infrastructure (gross fixed capital formation). National income is embezzled by African leaders and their national and international allies and serves only to enrich them or prepare their sustainability in power²².

One of the main causes of this situation is undoubtedly the system of cooperation that France imposed on its former African colonies at the time of their pseudo-independence. It is a unique system in the world, including all areas of cooperation²³ organized and articulated of more or less interdependent elements (Feuer G, 1973, p. 720). It is imposed en bloc for all the former colonies, as Prime Minister Michel Debré pointed out in a direct, cynical and paternalistic way when addressing the future President of the Gabonese State as a small child on July 15, 1960:

"Independence is granted on the condition that the State undertakes, once independent, to respect the cooperation agreements signed previously. There are two systems that come into effect at the same time: independence and cooperation agreements. One does not go without the other" (Debré Michel, 1965, p. 74).

The cooperation envisaged is therefore only the continuation of dependence in new guises. The French political leaders of the time made no secret of this, starting with General De Gaulle himself, who in a series of televised appearances at the beginning of the 1960s welcomed colonization and declined the need to continue the civilizing work through the famous cooperation designed as a relay to keep areas of political and economic influence against competitors and others²⁴. Fifteen years later, President Giscard d'Estaing explicitly reaffirmed this neocolonial nature of the Franco-African cooperation agreements during the Franco-African summit of May 10, 1976, explaining the need to remove from the concept of cooperation the notion of imperialism under all its forms²⁵.

Since any policy without doctrine is impossible, this French policy was based on neocolonialism, the main instrument of which is *Françafrique*²⁶. All African heads of state who refuse this neocolonial conversion will be the object of assassinations, coups or

²²MUSTAPHA Ely, « Cinquantième anniversaire de l'Union Africaine : 50 ans de misère africaine », AGORAVOX, 31 mai 2013, [En ligne] <http://www.agoravox.fr/tribune-libre/article/cinquantieme-anniversaire-de-l-136618> (Consulté le 10/04/2023).

²³Zone franc, coopération commerciale et douanière, coopération culturelle, coopération militaire, etc.

²⁴De Gaulle Charles, « Conférence de presse du 31 janvier 1964 », [En ligne] <http://www.gaullisme.fr/2014/08/08/conference-de-presse-du-31-janvier-1964/> (consulté le 13/04/2023); De Gaulle Charles, « Conférence de presse du 11 avril 1961 », [En ligne] <https://fresques.ina.fr/de-gaulle/fiche-media/Gaule00218/conference-de-presse-du-11-avril-1961.html> (consulté le 13/04/2023) et De Gaulle Charles, « Allocution du 16 avril 1964 », [En ligne] <https://fresques.ina.fr/de-gaulle/fiche-media/Gaule00232/allocution-du-16-avril-1964.html> (consulté le 13/04/2023).

²⁵Decraene Philippe, « Interview de Valéry Giscard d'Estaing », *Le Monde*, 4 mai 1976, [En ligne] <https://www.vie-publique.fr/discours/262651-interview-de-m-giscard-destaing-au-journal-le-monde-avant-louverture> (Consulté le 13/04/2023).

²⁶Versachave Francois-Xavier (2003), *La Françafrique : le plus long scandale de la République*, Paris, Stock, 379 pages et Péan Pierre (2005), *Affaires africaines*, Paris, Fayard, 340 pages.

¹⁹Organisation des Nations Unies, « Dix questions fréquemment posées sur l'Organisation des Nations Unies et la décolonisation », *Lettre d'information du Département des affaires politiques et de la consolidation de la paix* [En ligne] https://www.un.org/dppa/decolonization/sites/www.un.org.dppa.decolonization/files/10_faqs_un_and_decolonization_fr_0.pdf (consulté le 13/04/2023).

²⁰Conquête quelquefois durement, au prix de batailles traumatisantes, de la souffrance humaine et du sang.

²¹Un principe cardinal des relations interétatiques favorable à la création d'une société juste, à la lutte contre la pauvreté pour mener les pays vers la grandeur la prospérité et la dignité, autant de rêves qui ont accompagné l'accession des pays africains à l'indépendance autour des années 1960.

destabilization policies²⁷. It is a political and institutional system as well as all the more or less opaque networks, a unique system in the world which allows France to keep control over its newly independent former colonies by maintaining them in its dependence in a less discredited form. and delegitimized than direct colonization through the confiscation of their sovereignty. Yet the exercise of independence rests on the sovereign management of a number of essential powers, including defence, currency, foreign relations and diplomacy, justice and legislation.

Despite the principle of the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination, set out in paragraph 2 of article 1 of its Charter, the United Nations remained surprisingly silent on the neo-colonialist nature of these agreements. Franco-African cooperation. This complicit omerta of the UN can no doubt be explained by the colluding diplomacy of the permanent members of the Security Council. Relevant both to landed inter-statism and hegemonic super-statism. However, the key objectives of the United Nations are, among other things, to defend the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all States without exception, to put an unconditional end to colonialism in all these forms of Africa, to proscribe the hierarchization and subordination between States, etc.

As a result, this servile Franco-African cooperation made its way peacefully. Gradually, its scope developed into various forms, in this case official development assistance²⁸ and multi-sectoral cooperation, contaminating the relations of the major industrial powers with African states. In reality, these are just channels of submission to curb Africa. Moreover, when they have the opportunity, French politicians do not hide it to justify these paternalistic relationships. What the French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, ostentatiously did during his speeches in Dakar in 2007 and in Cape Town in 2008 by declaring that the tragedy of Africa is that the African man has not entered history enough. He thus proclaimed aloud this paternalistic state of mind of Westerners with regard to Africa: the reduction and maintenance of Africa to a backward society totally dependent on the West.

African marginality in a globalized economy

The globalized economy, understood from the angle of the influence of countries in the institutions of international economic and financial governance, of the liberalization of trade²⁹ and the free movement of capital, technology, financial services, goods and services between countries, does not have the same meaning and repercussions for everyone. This is particularly the case in developing countries, mainly African.

The evidence of these differences is notorious in the UN specialized institutions of international economic and financial governance, namely the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB)³⁰ created respectively in 1944 and 1945 without Africa. With in-depth expertise, they are intended to intervene anywhere in the world for the benefit of countries in economic and financial difficulty that request their support in order to promote growth and therefore development. Although their mission is complementary with regard to the world economy, the IMF, whose president is traditionally appointed by the Europeans, has the main mission of establishing a framework for international economic cooperation in order to avoid


the repetition of crises. like the one that led to the Great Depression of the late 1920s. As such, he oversees the stability of the international monetary system³¹ through the surveillance of the economic policies of the member countries by evaluating them and advising on monetary, financial and budgetary matters. Also, it provides financial assistance by granting loans to countries in difficulty that request it³² and technical assistance and training in various fields. As for the World Bank, whose choice of boss belongs to the United States, its founding mission is the fight against poverty in the world. Today, it pursues two objectives: to end extreme poverty in the world within the space of a generation and to promote shared prosperity between developing and developed countries. To do this, it has significant financial resources and a specific organization. Thus, it provides advantageous financial assistance measures to countries facing poverty. The financing offered can take the form of loans with low interest rates or no interest, or even donations. It also provides strategic advice and technical assistance to the governments of countries so that they can better manage their economy.

Under a concordat signed in 1989, the IMF and the WB collaborate to ensure greater effectiveness of the aid provided to member countries. Thus, IMF assessments of a country's economic situation and policy are taken into account in the assessment of development or reform projects carried out by the World Bank. Conversely, the latter's advice on structural or sectoral reforms is taken into consideration in the economic policy advice provided by the IMF. This collaboration between the two institutions has notably been formalized in a joint action plan which organizes the distribution of tasks and the definition of the work to be carried out during interventions for the benefit of a given country.

The IMF differs from the WB in that it cannot borrow on the financial markets. As a result, it relies only on its own resources from member countries to finance its interventions. Indeed, each member country is assigned a quota (see image no. 2 below, relative to the quotas of 2015) calculated according to its weight in the world economy. These quotas decide the maximum amount of financial resources that the country is required to provide to the institution.

Image no2

QUOTE-PARTS DES PAYS MEMBRES DU FMI



* Les 175 pays restants ont des quote-parts inférieure à 2 %

Source : lafinancepourtous.com d'après le Figaro et FMI

Lafinancepourtous, «Le fonctionnement du FMI », Faciléco, [En ligne] <https://www.economie.gouv.fr/facileco/fonctionnement-fmi#>

(Consulté le 06/04/2023)

²⁷Ce furent les cas de Sylvanus Olympio, Sékou Touré, Modibo Keita, etc.

²⁸Un mélange de prêts, d'allègement de dette et de dons qui en réalité est un véritable outil de tutelle au service des intérêts de la France et de ses entreprises.

²⁹Notamment par l'élimination des obstacles tarifaires et non tarifaires.

³⁰C'est un groupe réunissant quatre autres institutions : la Société financière internationale, créée en 1956 ; l'Association internationale de développement, fondée en 1960 ; le Centre international de règlement des différends, établi en 1966 ; et l'Agence multilatérale de garantie des investissements, mise sur pieds en 1988.

³¹C'est-à-dire le système international de paiements et de change qui permet aux pays de procéder à des échanges entre eux.

³²En contrepartie, le pays emprunteur doit s'engager à réaliser ses recommandations.

The country must pay its subscription in full upon joining. Also, they limit the amount of financial assistance that a member country can obtain from the IMF according to its financial participation in the institution. Finally, they determine the votes of each member of the IMF on the Executive Board³³. The latter is made up of twenty-four members, five of whom are appointed by the countries with the five highest quotas (United States, Japan, Germany, France and the United Kingdom) and nineteen are appointed by the others. member countries. If each country has a weighted vote, to the latter is added an additional vote for each fraction of the quota. Like the IMF, the votes of each member of the WB on the Board of Directors obey the same principle of the quota equivalent to the share subscribed to the capital of the IMF.

With regard to this system, it is obvious that the countries of the North manage without difficulty to gather the majority of vote and thus have all facility to pilot the IMF and the WB. Consequently, their preponderance is obvious on decision-making, in this case the definition of the conditions of the aid provided to member countries. These decisions are, for the most part, the recommendations of the consultation bodies that are the G7, G8 and G20³⁴ bringing together the leaders of the most industrialized countries and emerging countries (such as India, Brazil and China) to discuss the orientations of the world economy without Africa. These glaring imbalances easily explain the weak weight of poor countries, mostly African, in decision-making bodies within these international economic and financial institutions. Moreover, this masquerade of power sharing at the IMF aroused the anger of emerging countries who demanded the revision of voting rights. In 2006, the IMF then took the decision to complicate things with a reorganization in several stages and over several years. The first phase involved only four emerging countries, close to the United States and which, moreover, are buying US Treasury bonds en masse: China, South Korea, Mexico and Turkey. These few tenths of points more for their respective percentages do not jeopardize the stranglehold of the great powers on these institutions of international economic and financial governance³⁵.

Furthermore, Africa's marginality in a globalized economy is also evident in international trade. Yet trade plays an essential role in the development of this continent, whether between African countries or with the rest of the world. In other words, the global economy is a source of growth that African economies cannot afford to neglect. But, according to the statements of Ousmane Diagana, vice-president of the World Bank's representative for West and Central Africa, African exports of goods and services, although having recorded particularly rapid growth over the last ten years, their volume remains low, as it represents only barely 3% of world trade in 2022³⁶. The factors of this marginality are numerous. Above all, it is explained by the contexts of

the international and national environments which have not always been favorable. Indeed, the relatively high prices of non-tradable goods and services in Africa make this sector uncompetitive. To this is added respectively the specialization of certain African countries on agricultural products whose value weighs little in world exports; tariff and non-tariff barriers (administrative costs for exporting, border crossing time, poor state of transport infrastructure) relatively higher in Africa for agricultural goods than in the rest of the world, etc.

THE SUBSTANTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE AFRICAN SUBALTERN POSTURE IN THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

The substantial consequences of Africa's subaltern posture in the current international system are numerous. They are summed up in the reduction and maintenance of Africa to a backward society totally dependent on the West. Among other things, this is characterized by the alienation of the sovereignty of African states; the instrumentalization of international justice and international economic and financial institutions.

The alienation of the sovereignty of African states

During the negotiations for independence, the French-speaking African countries seem to have largely chosen the system of cooperation proposed by France as a means of exercising and consolidating their sovereignty. Is there really a choice? Not necessarily to the extent that they could anticipate that such cooperation would not serve their interests. The refusal of this system of cooperation by Sékou Touré (1958) and the conflictual relations with France which resulted from it confirm the coercive factors of this choice. Moreover, African literature³⁷ years following African independence in the 1960s already denounced the alleged sovereignty of African countries. This appeared as a nationalist call, or better, for the rehabilitation of African civilization. It is enough to take a look at certain aspects of the cooperation agreements imposed by France, to grasp the mechanisms of the alleged sovereignty of the countries concerned, maintaining the latter in the political, economic, commercial and military dependence of France. For example, at the economic level, the agreements signed between the Central African Republic, Congo, Chad and Gabon with France provide for an appendix on strategic raw materials (oil, uranium, minerals, gas, thorium, lithium, beryllium, helium, etc.). Article 4 of this appendix reserves these strategic raw materials to meet the domestic needs of the countries concerned. He therefore granted France priority in supply and a preference for the acquisition of surplus. Finally, it facilitates their storage for common defense needs. When the interests of this defense so require, this article requires partners to take the necessary measures to limit or prohibit the export of these strategic raw materials to other countries (Bouamama S, 2021).

Françafrique, the main instrument that has accompanied the entire history of the Fifth French Republic and still does today, guaranteeing this decades-old alienation from the sovereignty of African States, ensures an economic and political advantage for France over its former colonists now independent. Indeed, it allows France privileged access to strategic raw materials as well as cash crops (wood, cotton, etc.). It also allows France to preserve outlets for its companies and to keep Africa in the Western camp during the Cold War. This neo-colonialism of alienation from the sovereignty of African states that is decades old operates with the complicity of many African heads of

³³Il est composé de 24 membres dont 5 sont nommés par les pays qui détiennent les cinq quotas-parts les plus élevées (États-Unis, Japon, Allemagne, France et Royaume-Uni) et 19 sont désignés par les autres pays membres.

³⁴ Le Groupe des 7 (G7) regroupait à l'origine les chefs d'États des 7 pays de l'Allemagne, le Canada, les États-Unis, la France, l'Italie, le Japon et le Royaume-Uni. L'objectif de ces réunions était de traiter de questions économiques et financières afin d'ajuster leurs politiques économiques à court terme. Avec l'arrivée de la Russie en 1997, le G7 est ensuite devenu le G8. Les thèmes abordés ont alors été étendus à d'autres domaines que l'économie : développement, paix et sécurité, environnement. Le Groupe des 20 (G20) réunit chaque année les dirigeants des pays les plus industrialisés et des pays émergents (comme l'Inde, le Brésil et la Chine). Son objectif est de privilégier un véritable dialogue au niveau mondial plutôt que des prises de décisions individuelles ou par bloc. Depuis la crise financière de 2008, le principal mot d'ordre du G20 est d'œuvrer pour un retour à politiques économiques.

³⁵Vilain Rémi, « Qu'est-ce que le Fonds monétaire international (FMI) et comment fonctionne-t-il ? », Comité pour l'annulation de la dette du Tiers-Monde (CADTM), 15 octobre 2017, [En ligne] <https://www.cadtm.org/Quest-ce-que-le-Fonds-monetaire-international-FMI-et-comment-fonctionne-t-il> (Consulté le 06/04/2023)

³⁶ Banque mondiale pour l'Afrique de l'Ouest et centrale, Communiqué de presse 2022/040/AFW, 10 février 2022.

³⁷Dadié Bernard (1970), Béatrice au Congo, Paris, Présence Africaine, 148 pages.

state "friends of France" who are in reality only puppets installed in power by France and acquired to his interests³⁸.

On the political level, it takes the form of Franco-African summits; France's diplomatic network in Africa and in international organizations; the system of pre-positioned armed forces in certain African States³⁹; the protection and support of repressive political regimes (inhibitors of social transformations), the validation of rigged elections, the organization of coups, political assassinations, etc. Indeed, taking advantage of the negligence of these African Heads of State subordinated to France and without a political vision of development, but more concerned about their maintenance in power, France interferes in the politico-economic and even social orientation of certain African states. Any leader showing signs of independence and non-submission is gently removed from power if possible, viciously otherwise⁴⁰. The subversion in Guinea Conakry by the French special services from 1958 to 1973, the assassination of Thomas Sankara on October 15, 1987, the overthrow of Laurent Gbagbo on April 11, 2011 are some irrefutable illustrations. Thus, to ensure sustainability in power, the African heads of state subordinate to France are forced to turn a blind eye to the sovereign violations of France, to the detriment of the interests of their people forced into poverty and misery. (Verschave F X, 2004, p. 9). Economically, it is reflected in a non-exhaustive way by the looting of raw materials, corruption, trafficking of all kinds, etc., but above all by the peg of the CFA franc⁴¹ to the French franc and the euro thereafter. By imposing this currency on its former colonies, France sealed their economic sovereignty. This last colonial currency still used in the world allows France to control the monetary policy of its former colonies. Also, this real tool of economic and financial alienation of the African States of the CFA zone allows France to weigh in international finance. It is a system whose heart is France and the main instrument is the CFA franc. It is based on four main principles: the centralization of foreign exchange reserves in the French Treasury, the fixity of the CFA franc/euro parity⁴², the free convertibility of the CFA franc to the euro, and the free movement of capital between France and the African countries of the CFA franc zone. In addition to these principles, there is French participation in the management bodies of African central banks in the CFA franc zone. Each of these central banks has an operations account at the French Treasury and is required to deposit

part of its currency reserves there⁴³. Thus, France remunerates the African central banks in interest, while helping itself in passing. Worse, the share of interest paid to central banks is counted as official development assistance. Thus stripped of real monetary power (one of the areas that nevertheless constitute the sovereignty of a State), these countries of the CFA zone find themselves in a very precarious and difficult economic and social situation, especially since France imposes budgetary rigor⁴⁴ to guarantee the supply of the operations account. Their economic and financial sovereignty, recognized by all States, is thus flouted and becomes a mere view of the mind. This alienation of the sovereignty of African states is not without dramatic consequences. It generates geopolitical rivalries between the major industrial and hegemonic powers in Africa (as can be seen on map no. 1 below), dictatorships, crimes and wars for the struggle for power, poverty, migration, impunity on human rights violations.

Card #1

L'Afrique: tensions et conflits internes et rivalités géopolitiques entre les puissances



Modica Bruno (2016), « Pourquoi la France intervient-elle en Afrique ? »,

[En ligne] <https://www.clionautes.org/pourquoi-la-france-intervient-elle-en-afrique.html>

(Consulté le 10/04/2023)

In this permanent climate of violence, the maintenance of peace and security necessary for development proves to be difficult, even ambiguous, since it comes up against the complicit omerta of the UN on the neocolonialist nature of the Franco-African cooperation agreements, and the diplomacy of connivance of the permanent members of the UN Security Council, relating both to landed inter-statism and hegemonic super-statism. Thus, the Security Council is content to send additional blue helmets, but without significant political pressure (Novosseloff A, 2016, p.107-108). This largely justifies the successive failures of peacekeeping operations, despite the special attention of the UN on Africa⁴⁵. The former President of

³⁸Houphouët-Boigny en Afrique l'Ouest et Omar Bongo en Afrique centrale furent des acteurs majeurs de ce dernier. Par ailleurs, le président français, Emmanuel Macron ne s'en est pas caché en avril 202, lors des funérailles du président Tchadien, Idriss Déby, en saluant la mémoire d'un ami courageux de la France, avant d'adoubé la prise du pouvoir par le fils du défunt dictateur tchadien.

³⁹A travers ce principal pilier d'ingérence, la France intervient régulièrement en Afrique sous des prétextes fallacieux divers : rétablissement de l'ordre constitutionnel (cas du Gabon en 1964 suite au renversement du président Léon Mba ami de la France), soutien de la rébellion au non de la protection de la démocratie (cas de la Côte d'Ivoire en 2021), lutte contre le terrorisme (cas du Mali en 2013), etc.

⁴⁰Subversion en Guinée Conakry par les services spéciaux français de 1958 à 1973 ; Assassinat de Thomas Sankara le 15 octobre 1987 ; Renversement de Laurent Gbagbo le 11 avril 2011, etc.

⁴¹Rappels que le franc CFA est le nom de la monnaie commune à plusieurs pays francophones d'Afrique créée initialement en 1939 et devenue officielle le 26 décembre 1945 (le jour de la ratification des accords de Bretton Woods par la France et sa première déclaration de parité au Fonds monétaire international). Il signifie alors « franc des colonies françaises d'Afrique ». Après les indépendances, il devient « franc de la communauté financière d'Afrique », puis aujourd'hui « Communauté financière africaine ». Les pays quinze pays d'Afrique membres de la zone franc sont les suivant : d'une part, le Bénin, le Burkina, la Côte d'Ivoire, la Guinée-Bissau, le Mali, le Niger, le Sénégal et le Togo, qui constituent l'Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA) et dont l'Institut d'émission est la BCEAO ; d'autre part, le Cameroun, la Centrafrique, le Congo, le Gabon, la Guinée Equatoriale et le Tchad, qui constituent la Communauté Economique et Monétaire de l'Afrique Centrale (CEMAC), dont l'Institut d'émission est la Banque des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale (BEAC).

⁴² Malgré le passage à l'euro, la France garde la mainmise sur la zone franc CFA, alors même qu'elle n'est plus émettrice de la monnaie d'arrimage.

⁴³La Banque Centrale des Etats d'Afrique de l'Ouest (BCEAO), la Banque des Etats d'Afrique Centrale (BEAC), la Banque Centrale des Comores (BCC).

⁴⁴C'est-à-dire une baisse des dépenses publiques.

⁴⁵Historiquement l'Afrique est le théâtre des opérations de maintien de la paix de l'ONU. Sur les 70 missions déployées sous mandat onusien depuis 1948, 30 l'ont été

Niger, Mahamadou Issoufou, summed up the UN action in Africa in 2020 as follows: "50% of the issues on the agenda of the Security Council and 70% of those listed under Chapter VII of the Charter⁴⁶ relate to Africa"⁴⁷.

The instrumentalization of international justice

While it is undeniable that all justice is rendered in the name of the people, international justice has an untraceable people to compel States to serve it. Created in 1998 by the Rome Statute, to punish the most serious crimes against humanity when the criminals cannot be judged in their country, the International Criminal Court is not a homogeneous set of principles, knowledge and practices. This permanent international jurisdiction⁴⁸ is made up of members who do not share the same moral values, do not have common convictions, or do not share the common cause of transnational politics (Lefranc S and Mouralis G, 2014). As a result, his skills are quite limited. First of all, it can only recognize four categories of offences: crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes and crimes of aggression. Then, it can only intervene if the crime was committed on the territory of a State that has signed and ratified the Treaty or if the defendant is a national of one of these States. Finally, when a State which has not ratified the convention commits serious violations, the UN Security Council can give it jurisdiction to judge it in an exceptional manner (case of Darfur in 2005).

This mode of operation is not unrelated to its difficulties. It earned it the contempt of certain powerful and hegemonic states, such as the United States, Russia and China, which were not signatories to the Treaty of Rome and were in no hurry to do so or to submit their citizens to its jurisdiction. However, they spare no effort to exploit it, to the point of tarnishing the image of this international institution. A rather paradoxical attitude in an international system based on "legal interstateism". Indeed, it is accused of serving the interests of these powerful and hegemonic states. Its highly visible and publicized role on the African continent is evidence of this reproach. In the majority of cases in which the ICC prosecuted, it was African states that seized it. For example, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the Central African Republic (CAR) plagued by armed conflicts and serious crimes, seized it in 2004. In 2012 and 2014, this was respectively the case of Mali confronted to an armed rebellion on its territory and the CAR once again marked by violent armed conflict.

sur le continent africain. Aujourd'hui encore, ce continent demeure au centre des préoccupations du Conseil de sécurité. En 2015, 95 des 244 réunions du Conseil, 54 des 123 rapports remis par le Secrétaire général et 31 des 63 résolutions votées par le Conseil concernaient exclusivement l'Afrique. Ainsi, environ 40% du travail accompli par le Conseil concerne le continent africain : cf. Mathieu Olivier, « Le Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU s'intéresse-t-il trop à l'Afrique ? », Jeune Afrique, 3 mai 2016, [En ligne] <https://www.jeuneafrique.com/321911/politique/infographies-conseil-de-securite-de-lonu-sinteresse-t-a-lafrique/> (consulté le 21/05/2022). Au fil des années, cet engagement de l'ONU a pris, des formes très diverses et complémentaires selon les crises et les contextes politiques régionaux : des missions politiques spéciales (Somalie, Burundi, Guinée-Bissau, Libye), des bureaux régionaux (Afrique de l'Ouest, Sahel, Afrique centrale), des opérations multidimensionnelles (Mali, Centrafrique, RDC, Soudan du Sud, Libéria, Côte d'Ivoire), une mission logistique (Somalie) et une opération conjointe avec l'Union africaine (Darfour) et bien d'autres. À ces missions de terrain, il faut ajouter le travail des groupes d'experts des régimes de sanction, le rôle de médiation d'envoyés spéciaux, le rôle des agences humanitaires et le travail de la Commission de consolidation de la paix à l'égard de certains États sortant de crise (ce fut le cas du Burundi, la Sierra Leone, la Guinée, la Guinée-Bissau, le Libéria et la République centrafricaine) : cf. Novosseloff Alexandra (2016), « Engagement de l'ONU en Afrique : un état des lieux », Revue Défense Nationale, n°792, p.106-107.

⁴⁶Action en cas de menace contre la paix, de rupture de la paix et d'acte d'agression.

⁴⁷Blanchard Sandrine, « Les Africains s'estiment sous-représentés au sein de l'ONU », DW Akademie, 21/09/2021, [En ligne] <https://www.dw.com/fr/ONU-nations-unies-assembl%C3%A9e-g%C3%A9n%C3%A9rale-mission-de-paix-de-lonu-union-africaine/a-59247115> (Consulté le 31/05/2022).

⁴⁸Contrairement à d'autres cours mises en place pour juger des crimes particuliers, comme le tribunal de Nuremberg ou le Tribunal pénal international pour l'ex-Yougoslavie.

If these referrals by African states were then applauded because they gave him the opportunity to fight against impunity, his decision to prosecute four African heads of state (including two in office⁴⁹ when arrest warrants were issued against them) made its relations with Africa problematic (Guematcha, 2018). However, cases concerning similar situations around the world are legion⁵⁰. This geographical imbalance of international justice with imperialist overtones has not left African leaders and certain international human rights associations indifferent, to the point of qualifying it as justice of "Whites" against Africans. However, everything had started rather well between the ICC and Africa. Of the 122 states in the world that signed the Rome Statute, 34 are African. Which in fact constitutes the largest contingent of signatory states, i.e. 34 out of 55 African states (Gibert, 2015, p. 111-118).

The instrumentalization of the IMF and the WB

The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have a common goal, that of improving the standard of living of their member countries. Over the decades, the gradual globalization of financial markets and increasing openness to external markets have enabled these two international economic and financial institutions to occupy a prominent place in both the global economy and national economies. Given the hegemonic stakes and the preponderance of the countries that hold the five highest quotas on the decision-making of these institutions, it is clearly established that they exert a certain influence on their interventions in the other founding States. In other words, these international economic institutions are part of an international conspiracy intended to serve the interests of multinationals and Western countries first.

Thus, many studies have, in fact, demonstrated that their structural adjustment programs are an instrument of subjugation of Third World countries, of slowing down the development of these countries (in Africa and elsewhere), of alienating them politically and economically those of the West. Consequently, their authors call for a reorientation of these two international financial economic institutions. Which finds a favorable echo. Despite the official positions of certain major powers, in favor of a new international monetary and financial regulation, this is very unlikely for us. Moreover, the new architecture proposed by the ad hoc working groups (established since 1998) under the aegis of the G 7 and the G 22, is similar to an agenda of international consultations (Cartapanis A, 2001, p 4).

⁴⁹La CPI délivre deux mandats d'arrêt contre Omar El Béchir, Président en exercice du Soudan. Elle en fait de même contre Mouammar Kadhafi, Président en exercice de la Libye, et Laurent Gbagbo, ancien Président de la Côte d'Ivoire. La CPI lance également des poursuites contre Uhuru Kenyatta, qui deviendra Président du Kenya au cours de la procédure, sans que cette évolution de son statut altère la décision de la Cour de le poursuivre

⁵⁰Par exemple, après les attentats terroristes du 11 septembre 2001 contre les Etats-Unis, le Président Georges Bush créa la prison de Guantanamo pour torturer les prisonniers accusés de terrorisme, ce en violation du droit international et des droits de l'homme ; entre 2016 et 2018, sous l'impulsion des politiques décidées par l'Union européenne (UE), plus de 40 000 victimes furent interceptées et transportées dans des centres de détention en Libye. En dépit des éléments évidents dans ce crime choquant et scandaleux contre l'humanité, aucune procédure d'enquête ne fut lancée (cf. Court Pénale Internationale, « Déclaration du Procureur de la CPI au CSNU sur la situation en Libye », 09 mai 2017, [En ligne] <https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/statement-icc-prosecutor-uncsc-situation-libya> (consulté le 21/05/2022) ; Pennetier Marine, « La France demande à la Libye d'agir face aux "crimes contre l'humanité" des migrants », Reuters, 22 novembre 2017, [En ligne] <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-migrants-france-tells-libya-to-act-overmigrant-crimes-against-humanity-idUSKBN1DM1YU> (consulté le 21/05/2022) ; Dalhuisen John (Directeur régional du programme Europe d'Amnesty International), « UE-Libye : les images du marché aux esclaves témoignent du coût humain d'accords migratoires inexcusables », Amnesty International info, 27 novembre 2017, [En ligne] <https://www.amnesty.be/infos/actualites/article/sommet-ue-afrique-les-images-du-marche-aux-esclaves-temoignent-du-cout-humain-d> (consulté le 21/05/2022).

Among the harsh criticisms of these institutions, the American economist Joseph Stiglitz (2002) delivers a critical analysis of the management of globalization by the international economic institutions which he qualifies as undemocratic, while rejecting the thesis of an international conspiracy intended to primarily serve the interests of multinationals and Western countries. Drawing on his experience as chief economist at the WB, he observes when examining the IMF that its objective seems to be to serve the interests of the financial community. This observation finds meaning through the facts that led this institution to precipitate or aggravate the crises it was supposed to prevent or cure, without which it would appear intellectually incoherent. For Stiglitz, the IMF is characterized by a curious mixture of ideology and bad economics, a dogma that sometimes barely conceals private interests (p. 22). The policies there are carried out without contradictory debate, under strong ideological influence, and often give bad results. The author even describes them as undemocratic. Thus, the question of who decides what the IMF does arises for all international economic institutions and the answer is clear: They are dominated not only by the richest industrial countries, but also by commercial and financial interests in their bosom (p. 44).

In the same vein, Eric Toussaint (2006), by diving behind the scenes of geopolitics and international finance, reveals that contrary to popular belief, the WB does not have the mission of reducing poverty. Instead of fighting it, it reproduces it. The WB and its twin the IMF are instruments of subordination of indebted countries to the interests of the most industrialized powers. For him, one of the little-known elements of these instruments of subordination is the mechanism of colonial debts, where how the World Bank granted loans to serve the financial interests of a certain number of colonial powers, sometimes just before independence (mining interests from France to Mauritania for example), debts that will be bequeathed to the newly independent countries like so many nooses. Éric Toussaint puts understanding within everyone's reach, thus shedding light on the present to better conceive how to change the future. Indeed, these instruments of subordination claim that, in order to develop, poor countries must resort to external debt. Except that this indebtedness is fundamentally profitable to the companies of the restricted club of powerful and hegemonic States. Mainly, the approach consists of going to poor countries where there are vital strategic natural resources for Western industries, in order to offer them the possibilities of exploitation. Since these are poor countries, devoid of financial means, know-how and processing plants, the WB grants them loans of thousands of dollars for the exploitation of their natural resources, a guarantee of development. But, in these contracts, a clause obliges these poor countries to build the infrastructures necessary for this exploitation. Therefore, it takes experienced Western companies to build them. Thus, the money lent to poor countries to carry out their development projects is sent back to the industrialized countries, via the payment of services offered by their companies and the financing of secret agreements⁵¹. In the end, the poor countries find themselves strangled by the reimbursement of its excessive and harmful debts, without forgetting the payment of the interests relating thereto. To get out of it, only two possible solutions: either they borrow again, which doubles their debt, or they sell off their natural resources for almost nothing. A strong dependence on Western capital in the form of loans then sets in with the illusion of reaching a level of self-sustained development. This instrumentalization of the WB allows some Western countries to control and exploit poor countries. Through the

⁵¹Garantie du monopole des sociétés occidentales en échange de la consolidation du pouvoir personnel des autocrates au pouvoir, pots-de-vin des dirigeants de l'État emprunteur, etc. Ainsi donc, ces prêts financiers seraient, en fait, des subventions accordées aux dirigeants de l'État emprunteur protecteurs des intérêts occidentaux au détriment de ceux de leurs propres États.

WB, they impose on them multiple so-called structural adjustment plans⁵², largely made up of privatization programs that result in the deterioration of key sectors such as health, education, agriculture, etc. The icing on the cake is growing debt. Despite this, the WB seeks to distort reality in order to continue to propagate this shady system of financial and technical assistance learnedly taught in most Western universities. So far, it has not allowed the African continent to begin its development. The perversion of the cotton sector in Mali by the WB is a perfect illustration of this. Indeed, cotton production in Mali is one of the rare success stories of the African continent. It was based on a centralized organization through a parastatal company, the Malian Company for the Development of Textiles. Like any development company centered on a specific product or infrastructure, it had a broad rural development vocation. It thus compensated for the lack of provision of collective goods by the State. Its objective was to enable all producers to become cotton growers, which resulted in equipment programs, functional literacy courses, support for livestock development, maintenance of rural roads, etc. This resulted in the success of cotton production in Mali until the 1980s. life of cotton farmers from the 1990s (Géronimi Vincent, Mainguy Claire et al, 2013, p. 13-33).

Naturally, this neo-capitalist policy of alienation and subordination of poor and indebted countries (mostly African) to the interests of the most industrialized powers has further led to the dislocation of their economic and social fabric. This results in the crisis of state authority, the increase in poverty, social and political conflicts vector of civil wars.

OUTLINE OF THREE PATHWAYS TO AFRICAN LEADERSHIP FOR TOTAL EMANCIPATION

Faced with all these African servitude towards the West, it seems obvious that the main cause of African underdevelopment is not the absence of democratic institutions, but the maintenance of this continent in a largely profitable subordinate position. in the West since the 15th century. Indeed, Africa is the largest continent in the world, with an infinite beauty of nature and an abundance of its raw materials, its flora and its fauna highly envied by other continents and particularly by the powers Western hegemon. Faced with the limitation of the natural resources of Western powers, Africa appears as the dairy cow for the supply of the industries of the latter and the affirmation of their powers.

As a result, Westerners have long understood that by taking control of African raw materials, they could dominate the world. This explains the maintenance of Africa in a subordinate position which is largely profitable to them. If the respect of international standards did not often allow the emancipatory actions, of this alienation, this time is over. It is time for Africa to be the true master of its own destiny and by extension of its development, defined on the basis of its endogenous traditions revisited in the light of the challenges of the 21st century and of what it has been able to draw from the best, during the decades of servitude largely profitable to the West imposed by the UN system. Given that the mission of the UN international system is precisely to defeat landed inter-stateism and hegemonic super-stateism, the construction of a new Africa, a major player in international relations and not a simple subject subject, is possible. . This requires, among other things, the deconstruction of Franco-African servile cooperation agreements and the achievement of African economic independence through the creation of pan-African financial institutions, dear to the late Libyan President

⁵²Condition sine qua non de financement des projets sectoriels de développement de ces pays pauvres.

Muammar Gaddafi. Considering the exceptional powers of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, better African representation with veto power within this body is a pressing imperative. To assume this responsibility, a new generation of transformational leaders not subordinate to the West is fundamental.

The deconstruction of Franco-African servile cooperation agreements

Franco-African servile cooperation agreements are a taboo subject in Africa. Often the exclusive domain of Heads of State, these agreements, without being written with the bestial brutality of the Black Codes, are nonetheless indicative of a philosophy of exchanges that is retrograde, superstitious, derogatory and anti-sovereignist to say the least. regard to Africa, as we demonstrated earlier. To mark a break with the latter and open a new era of Franco-African cooperation, drawing all the consequences of the past and based on a defined and respected partnership between the parties involved, it is imperative for Africa to take advantage of the current changes in international balances, one of the manifest signs of which is the beginning of the decline of Western hegemony⁵³ to the benefit of the growing influence of China⁵⁴, India⁵⁵ and Russia⁵⁶.

Indeed, the West is no longer the same: the Western ruling elites seem to have run out of a universalist project; China competes with the United States for the first place in the world economy; Russia defeats the United States militarily with the Ukraine War, thus allowing the peoples of the world to discover, stunned, that the West is militarily naked; information from the West is nothing more than propaganda, as evidenced by the degradation of the ethics of communication and information in many of its media, in short the decline of Western hegemony is more and more obvious for a specialist in International Relations, despite his resistance.

This new vision of the future of the world is now in the opposite camp, that of a world freed from all forms of hegemony, a world freed from the dictatorship of the dollar.⁵⁷ and from blackmail to economic sanctions, a world of nations with equal rights, where sovereignty is the guarantee of reciprocal respect as well as the freedom of citizens, allows national development long hampered in Africa the current international system. In order to complete the sovereignty of African countries which are still experiencing France's untimely intrusion, to raise one's head, to watch France see Westerners in general face to face without stooping, the deconstruction of Franco-African servile cooperation agreements is imperative. This fight for total African political, economic and financial independence necessarily requires the definition and establishment of a partnership of equals on the basis of ethics, with a view to acting for the common benefit. It also requires a lot of willpower, courage and determination, as evidenced by the current political line of certain African countries, in this case CAR, Mali and Burkina Faso. Without pouring into the propaganda of the modes of action of this political line, it must be supported and inspire all the former French colonies in Africa, because only a multi-sectoral collective fight (political, economic, diplomatic, and military) could come to put an end to these servitudes that have been firmly

rooted for decades. It requires willpower, determination, perseverance, overcoming egos and selfish personal interests. United we resist, victory will be possible.

The creation of pan-African economic and financial institutions

Given that the policies of international economic and financial institutions based on the liberal dogma of the infallibility of the market are an instrument of alienation and politico-economic submission of poor countries (mainly African) to the hands of a restricted club of powerful and hegemonic States, African development could therefore not pass through them. This is at least what the late Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi understood when he dared to put forward the idea of African economic and financial independence⁵⁸.

The story begins with the adoption in 1991 of the Abuja Treaty⁵⁹ establishing the creation of the African Economic Community (AEC) in six stages over a period of 34 to 40 years maximum. At the same time, wishing to acquire, for four hundred million dollars, an African communication satellite which would save the five hundred million dollars annually paid for the rental of Western satellites, African governments came up against the veto of the WB and the IMF. Faced with this refusal, the Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi then decided to bear 75% of the construction costs of the satellite, while the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the West African Development Bank (BOAD) took charge. 25% in order to make this project a reality (Bukari-Yabara A, 2014). On May 27, 1992, the result was the creation of the Regional African Satellite Communication Organization (RASCOC) by 45 African countries. Based in Abidjan, it is responsible for defining low-cost telecommunications services based on space technology in liaison with the telecommunications operators of these countries.

In July 2000, following the adoption of the Sirte Declaration in September 1999, the 36th OAU Summit in Lomé adopted the Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU) by which the Heads of State and Government proposed the creation of two additional financial institutions, namely the African Monetary Fund (AMF) and the African Investment Bank (AIB), especially since the African Central Bank (ACB) was already provided for in the Abuja Treaty at its Article 6. Thus, Article 19 of the Constitutive Act of the AU recognizes that these three institutions, in particular the BCA, the AMF and the AIB, constitute the financial institutions of the AU whose operating rules and regulations are defined in related protocols. In addition, the AU Commission was tasked in January 2006 by the AU Assembly with carrying out a study on the feasibility of creating a pan-African stock exchange. Deciding to get Africa out of its servile dependence on the West, Gaddafi invested in the creation of the three financial institutions and the Pan-African Stock Exchange mentioned. Thus, he planned 30 billion US dollars for the Libyan contribution to the finalization of these three flagship projects.⁶⁰ Having become the flagship program of the AU's Agenda 2063, these African financial institutions are considered essential for accelerating regional integration and the socio-economic development of the continent. The BCA is set up within the framework of Agenda 2063 and is between 2028 and 2034. It will be based on the Joint Strategy of the African Union Commission / the Association of African Central

⁵³En vigueur depuis le XV^e siècle.

⁵⁴Une puissance qui concurrence les États Unis à la première place de l'économie mondiale.

⁵⁵Potentielle deuxième puissance économique dans les années 50, dont personne n'en parle.

⁵⁶Allié fortifiant sa coopération avec la Chine et l'Inde.

⁵⁷Depuis un certain temps, les pays du BRICS (Brésil Russie, Inde, Chine Afrique du Sud) dont la Russie et la Chine, manœuvrent pour s'affranchir du dollar américain. Récemment, la Chine a officialisé une entente avec le Brésil pour commercer d'État à État, sans passer par le dollar. Cette stratégie d'indépendance financière pourrait impulser la création d'un nouvel ordre économique mondial.

⁵⁸Cette initiative fut mal vue par les États-Unis et l'Union Européenne. Pour la France, la Libye était une menace pour la sécurité financière de l'humanité. En conséquence il fut assassiné.

⁵⁹Organisation de l'unité africaine (OUA), *Traité instituant la création de la Communauté économique africaine* (CEA), Abuja (Nigeria), 03 juin 1991. Entré en vigueur le 12 mai 1994, il marque la concrétisation de l'article II de la Charte de l'OUA signée à Addis Abeba le 25 mai 1963.

⁶⁰Condé Mohamed, « Savez-vous si le Fonds Monétaire Africain existe? », *Africanouvelles*, 09/05/2016, [En ligne] <https://www.africanouvelles.com/savez-vous-si-le-fonds-monetaire-africain-existe/> (consulté le 16/04/2023)

Banks (ABCA), which was adopted in August 2015. Preparations for the BCA will be done through the African Monetary Institute, which is expected to be established before the BCA. The BCA will aim to develop a common monetary policy and a single African currency with a view to accelerating economic integration. Its objectives will be to create and manage the single currency of the continent⁶¹; to promote international monetary cooperation through a permanent institution; promote exchange rate stability and avoid competitive exchange rate depreciation; contribute to the establishment of a multilateral system for the settlement of current transactions between members and eliminate exchange restrictions which hinder the growth of world trade⁶². The AMF, whose constitutive act provides for the creation in 2023, aims to promote macroeconomic stability, shared sustainable economic growth and balanced development of the Continent in order to facilitate the effective integration of African economies. To do this, through article 3 of its statutes, it aims to correct the imbalances in the balance of payments of the States Parties; promote the stability of exchange rates between currencies and their mutual convertibility; promote African monetary cooperation in order to achieve African economic integration and accelerate the development process of States Parties; promote the development of African financial markets; strengthen capacities for the design and implementation of debt management policies enabling States Parties to maintain sustainable levels of indebtedness; work to facilitate the settlement of commercial debts and help establish a system of settlement of current transactions between State Parties with a view to promoting intra-African trade. In the long term, it must replace in all and for all the activities on African soil of the International Monetary Fund, which has brought an entire continent to its knees with questionable privatizations, such as forcing African countries to move from a monopoly public to private monopoly⁶³.

Finally, the BAI, whose statutes were adopted by the AU Assembly at the July 2009 Summit, aims to promote economic growth and accelerate economic integration in Africa. Its objectives are to promote public and private investment activities aimed at advancing the regional integration of AU Member States; to use available resources for the implementation of investment projects contributing to the strengthening of the private sector and the modernization of rural sector activities and infrastructure; to mobilize resources from the capital markets in Africa and elsewhere for the financing of investment projects in African countries; to provide technical assistance to African countries, when needed, for the study, preparation, financing and execution of investment projects⁶⁴.

This African economic and financial independence, so dear to the late Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi, is the path to African economic integration for successful integration into the global economy. The realization of this vast ambitious and strategic project is strewn with pitfalls. Whatever the obstacles, it must not be compromised because the African destiny depends on it. Admittedly, the road will be long and arduous, but the specific gains to be drawn from this economic and financial independence are inestimable. Aware of these advantages, Africa must mobilize more than ever. It requires willpower, determination, perseverance, overcoming egos and selfish personal interests.

Better African representation in the United Nations Security Council

How to understand that with its 55 Member States of the United Nations Member States (i.e. 25% of the Member States) representing 1.3 billion of the world's population⁶⁵, Africa has only 2 non-permanent member seats on the Security Council⁶⁶ out of the 15 seats that make it up⁶⁷. Since there is no friendship between states but simply interests, only the state itself can better defend its own interests. As a result, the current African representation on the United Nations Security Council is a factor in the infantilization of Africa by those who claim to help it, to know better than itself what is good for it, to better determine its priorities. When in reality it is just to get hold of his immense wealth.

Seventy years after the birth of the United Nations system characterized by the restricted access of the member countries of the Security Council, a body ensuring the maintenance of peace and security in the world, it is time to correct this historical injustice. against Africa who trample on the founding principles of the United Nations. This requires representation that is fairer, more inclusive and more adapted to the realities of the 21st century. Consequently, the full permanent representation of Africa in the Security Council with the right of veto is not an ideal to be achieved for African States, but rather a right in keeping with the spirit of the founding principles of the United Nations. The right of veto being a matter of justice for all and that as long as it exists, it must be granted to all permanent members (old and new). The stakes are so high that Africans must not miss this appointment with history. This is a step for Africa to finally become a major player in international relations, capable of making its voice heard in the politico-diplomatic architecture of global governance. What the African Union seems to have understood.

Indeed, refusing to continue to submit to the diktat of the restricted club of powerful and hegemonic States, permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, holders of the right of veto, whose management of global governance hinders African development, the African Union (UA) through the C10⁶⁸, South Africa, Senegal and other African countries have been fighting for years to reform the United Nations Security Council. Supported by a few major powers (China and Germany in particular), they are calling for better representation of the continent within the governing bodies of the United Nations, particularly the Security Council. It is in this perspective that, in the name of a demographic rebalancing, the AU adopted, on March 7 and 8, 2005, a common position known as the Ezulwini consensus in Swaziland to demand the full representation of Africa on the Security Council. by the allocation of two seats of permanent members with a right of veto and five non-permanent seats⁶⁹. However, it is not surprising to see a refusal to accept this proposal by powerful and hegemonic states adept at "land inter-stateism" and "hegemonic super-statism". Very ingenious in the exploitation of subjective perceptions⁷⁰, they constantly torpedo this African demand to have the status quo accepted, arguing that any attempt to go against the course of history will lead to chaos (Yacine-Touré Ben, 1983). In the face of fierce opposition, an African pressure

⁶⁵Blanchard Sandrine, « Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU : Sall et Ramaphosa réclament une réforme », Le Point, 10/12/2021, [En ligne] https://www.lepoint.fr/afrique/conseil-de-securite-de-l-onu-sall-et-ramaphosa-reclament-une-reforme-10-12-2021-2456227_3826.php (Consulté le 25/06/2022).

⁶⁶Rotatifs pour des périodes de deux ans.

⁶⁷Blanchard Sandrine, op. cit.

⁶⁸Un groupe de dix pays mandatés par l'UA pour négocier la réforme du Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies

⁶⁹Blanchard Sandrine, op. cit. et Le Point Afrique, op. cit.

⁷⁰L'instabilité politique persistante en Afrique, faible contribution financière de l'Afrique au budget de l'ONU estimée à 0,01% en 2021, contre 25% pour les Etats-Unis, etc. (cf. Blanchard Sandrine, op. cit. et Le Point Afrique, op. cit.).

⁶¹Cette monnaie africaine signera la fin du Franc CFA dont la France a la main mise. On comprend dès lors et encore une fois la rage de Paris contre Kadhafi.

⁶²Union africaine (2017), *Les institutions financières panafricaines*, Addis Abeba, Département des Affaires Economiques, Commission de l'Union africaine, p.4-5.

⁶³Idem.

⁶⁴Ibid.

strategy is viable and vital. At first glance, the African room for maneuver is very narrow, with regard to leadership conflicts against a backdrop of external manipulation. If the economic weight of India, the commercial power of Germany, the influence of Japan, the emergence of Brazil or even the petro dollars of the Gulf countries did not allow these countries to have these seats coveted, it is difficult to see the map that the African continent could lay out. Moreover, approached in terms of state power and not of representation of the continent, this question has divided Africans since 2005. Thus, South Africa, Egypt and Nigeria claim to be able to legitimately fulfill these functions. From the observation of these three candidates, it seems that only South Africa does not seem to display national ambitions on this file. She says she wants to favor cohesion between the states of the continent and not to make her own interests prevail. Nevertheless, there is unofficial competition between South Africans and Nigerians over, among other things, continental leadership. As for Egypt, justifying its candidacy on behalf of the representation of Africa north of the Sahara and of the Arab-Muslim world, it clearly displays its national ambitions: to overcome its competition with the Maghreb countries and guarantee its security in regard to Israel. Black Africa feels in no way represented by this Egyptian candidacy perceived as Arab and distant. Other candidates have also declared themselves: two countries from sub-Saharan Africa (Kenya and Senegal) and two countries from North Africa (Libya and Algeria). According to Novosseloff (2006, p. 9-10), the Senegalese (French-speaking) candidacy seems less credible compared to that of the two giants, South Africa and Nigeria. Considering the stakes of the reconquest of African sovereignty, Africans must not allow themselves to be exploited by certain powerful and hegemonic States that largely benefit from the current international system and therefore resist reform. It is time to overcome Western reluctance and instrumentalization, to deconstruct the narratives that persist in confining Africa to the margins of the decision-making circles of global governance, to uphold the just and legitimate African demand for the reform of the Council of Security, as reflected in the Ezulwini Consensus. Admittedly, this African demand cannot be simple orientations of isolated national policies. It must be a unifying political project on a continental scale, supported by all African States without exception and materialized by a well-developed pressure strategy, ruling out leadership conflicts.

Consequently, an inter-African dialogue taking due account of the opinions and interests of each is imperative. It would allow the evaluation of States capable of assuming the role of leader at the regional and continental level, on the basis of criteria favorable to African interests, defined by convention and taking into account all the challenges of global governance. Also, this approach should make the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of Central Africa (ECCAS), of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)⁷¹ and others from international advocacy institutions. The advantage of this strategy lies respectively in the coordination of lobbying activities with international institutions and Western countries, the consensual establishment of a diplomacy favorable to African interests, the ability to speak with one voice to defend the interests African.

However, the problem of these African governance institutions is that the majority of Member States are struggling to pay their contributions, which forces them to depend heavily on funding from donors outside Africa to carry out their programs and carry out their activities. Therefore, on their financial independence depends their ability to carry the project of reconquering African sovereignty. To do

so, they must imperatively emancipate themselves from external funding to protect themselves from attempts at instrumentalization.

The imperative of a new generation of transformational African leaders not subordinate to the West

To successfully wage the battle for African emancipation from Western servitude, a new generation of transformational leaders not subordinate to the West is fundamental. Therefore, the questions that any observer can ask themselves are whether Africa suffers more from a lack of leadership and skills than from a lack of real will on the part of many Africans themselves to develop their continent? Aren't the majority of today's leaders already educated and qualified? So many questions that give rise to many debates and whose answers are certainly not obvious. Be that as it may, it is undeniable that current African leaders are formatted and influenced by the West. How can we admit that future African leaders continue to train on the same model? If it is so true that in the West, most of the elite is trained in universities, is not the success of the training of the new generation of transformational African leaders not subordinate to the West in the African academic institutions? The proliferation of leadership training programs, elite schools and academies of excellence, in this case the African Leadership Academy of Johannesburg, which are multiplying in Africa seems to give an affirmative answer to these questions. The training of the new generation of transformational African leaders not subordinate to the West must be a fundamental African concern. It symbolizes the desire to see the emergence on the continent of a new elite, better able to find solutions to its problems and to carry out efficient actions with a view to its development. A far from trivial phenomenon that certainly deserves closer attention. The future of Africa is sometimes as much of a concern as the initiatives put in place to prepare for it. Initiatives behind which there are always major non-African personalities or institutions. Convinced that the future of the continent depends largely on the potential of its future transformational leaders not subordinated to the West, the need to train them is essential such as seem to be the objectives that these elite schools and academies give themselves. 'Excellency. Indeed, this training must integrate the positive values of ancestral African traditions revisited in the light of the challenges of the 21st century and what Africa has been able to draw from the best, during the decades of its servitude to the West. This is where African efforts to train a new generation of transformational African leaders not subordinated to the West should be resolutely directed. Ultimately, this will translate into a more rational use of the skills that exist, putting the right men and women in the right places, with a view to achieving better results. Thus Africa would no longer have to appeal to politicians lacking vision and sometimes lacking in skills and appropriate qualifications to manage national and pan-African structures. And the fact of having simply taken on the duties of minister, head of government and/or state or of belonging to the family, clan or ethnic group will no longer be a sufficient criterion for the management of countries and institutions in a globalized economy.

CONCLUSION

Using a few basic facts, we have shown that the regulation of international public order is not the best shared thing. Indeed, despite the legal validity of sovereign equality recognized to all States, powerful States decide the fate of the weakest, mostly African. This historic violation of the cardinal principle of interstate relations, the founding principle of the UN system, allows this select club of powerful states to always play games with international law in order to preserve their selfish vital and strategic interests. This violation results in the maintenance of the weakest in a servile dependence on

⁷¹En français : l'autorité intergouvernementale pour le développement.

them by powerful States. The broad evidence in Africa is characterized, among other things, by the reduction and maintenance of this continent to a backward society totally dependent on the West, the alienation of the sovereignty of African states; the instrumentalization of international justice and international economic and financial institutions. These are all factors of internal tensions and conflicts, perversion of African economies and many others which constitute an atavistic obstacle to African development.

Therefore, the mission of the UN international public order being precisely to defeat land inter-stateism and hegemonic super-stateism, the correction of this historical injustice is the responsibility of African states. It is based on their ability to complete their African political, economic and financial independence. This is a sine qua non condition for the sustainable development of this continent. To do this, the time is no longer for the denunciation of African servitudes and their consequences, but for actions of total emancipation. This requires, among other things, the deconstruction of Franco-African servile cooperation agreements and the achievement of African economic independence through the creation of pan-African financial institutions, so dear to the late Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi. Considering the exceptional powers of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, he also calls for better African representation with the right of veto within this body. To assume this new responsibility, a generation of transformational leaders not subordinate to the West is fundamental. What Africans seem to have understood, given the various initiatives underway on the continent: the deconstruction of Franco-African servile cooperation agreements by the CAR, Mali and Burkina Faso, Ezulwini's consensus on better representation with the right of veto within the UN Security Council, the creation of pan-African financial institutions, the emergence of leadership training programs, elite schools and academies of excellence, etc. It is an appointment with history that Africa must not miss under any circumstances. He recommends overcoming conflicts of equals and unsuccessful leadership.

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